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Abstract
Cloud computing has the potential to provide low-cost, scalable computing, but cloud security is a major area of
concern. Many organizations are therefore considering using a combination of a secure internal cloud, along with
(what they perceive to be) less secure public clouds. However, this raises the issue of how to partition applications
across a set of clouds, while meeting security requirements. Currently, this is usually done on an ad-hoc basis, which is
potentially error-prone, or for simplicity the whole application is deployed on a single cloud, so removing the possible
performance and availability beneﬁts of exploiting multiple clouds within a single application. This paper describes an
alternative to ad-hoc approaches – a method that determines all ways in which applications structured as workﬂows
can be partitioned over the set of available clouds such that security requirements are met. The approach is based on
a Multi-Level Security model that extends Bell-LaPadula to encompass cloud computing. This includes introducing
workﬂow transformations that are needed where data is communicated between clouds. In speciﬁc cases these
transformations can result in security breaches, but the paper describes how these can be detected. Once a set of
valid options has been generated, a cost model is used to rank them. The method has been implemented in a tool,
which is described in the paper.
Introduction
Cloud computing is of growing interest due to its poten-
tial for delivering cheap, scalable storage and processing.
However, cloud security is a major area of concern that
is restricting its use for certain applications: “Data Conﬁ-
dentiality and Auditability” is cited as one of the top ten
obstacles to the adoption of cloud computing in the inﬂu-
ential Berkeley report [1]. While security concerns are
preventing some organizations from adopting cloud com-
puting at all, others are considering using a combination
of a secure internal “private” cloud, along with (what they
perceive to be) less secure “public” clouds. Sensitive appli-
cations can then be deployed on a private cloud, while
those without security concerns can be deployed exter-
nally on a public cloud. However, there are problems with
this approach. Currently, the allocation of applications to
clouds is usually done on an ad-hoc, per-application basis,
which is not ideal as it lacks rigour and auditability. Fur-
ther, decisions are often made at the level of granularity of
the whole application, which is allocated entirely to either
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a public or private cloud based on a judgment of its over-
all sensitivity. This eliminates the potential beneﬁts for
partitioning an application across a set of clouds, while
still meeting its overall security requirements. For exam-
ple, consider a medical research application in which data
from a set of patients’ heart rate monitors is analyzed. A
workﬂow used to analyze the data from each patient is
shown in Figure 1. The input data is a ﬁle with a header
identifying the patient, followed by a set of heart rate
measurements recorded over a period of time. A service
(Anonymize) strips oﬀ the header, leaving only the mea-
surements (this application is concerned with the overall
results from a cohort of patients, not with individuals). A
second service (Analyze) then analyzes themeasurements,
producing a summary.
Analyzing the heart rate data is computationally expen-
sive, and would beneﬁt from the cheap, scalable resources
that are available on public clouds. However, most orga-
nizations would be unlikely to consider storing medical
records on a public cloud for conﬁdentiality and, in some
cases, legal reasons. Therefore, one solution is to deploy
the whole workﬂow on a secure private cloud. However,
this may overload the ﬁnite resources of the private cloud,
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Figure 1 An example medical data analysis workﬂow.
resulting in poor performance, and potentially a negative
impact on other applications.
An alternative solution is to partition the application
between the private cloud and an external public cloud
in order to exploit the strengths of both. This could be
attempted in an ad-hoc fashion by a security expert but,
as this paper describes, there are challenges in work-
ing out the set of partitioning options that still preserve
the required security of data and services. This paper
therefore describes an alternative to ad-hoc solutions –
a method that takes an application consisting of a set of
services and data connected in a workﬂow, and deter-
mines the valid set of deployments over a set of clouds,
ensuring that security requirements aremet. Although the
paper is focused on workﬂows in which services commu-
nicate through passing data, the method can be applied
to other types of distributed system that are composed
of a set of communicating components. The method is
based on Multi-Level Security models [2], speciﬁcally
Bell-LaPadula [3]. The result of the method is the com-
plete set of options that meet the organization’s security
requirements for the application. The method introduces
transformations that need to be performed on the work-
ﬂows where data is communicated between clouds; the
paper identiﬁes the security issues that can be raised
as a result, and the extra security checks that need to
be performed to address this. When the method results
in more than one valid partitioning option, there is the
issue of how to choose the best. The paper shows how a
cost model can be introduced to rank the valid options;
a model based on price is deﬁned, and applied to the
running medical workﬂow example. The full method,
including the cost model, has been implemented in a
tool that has been built to automate and explore its
application.
The paper is structured as follows. TheMethod section
gives a brief introduction to Multi-Level Security models
and Bell-LaPadula. It then describes how the Bell-
LaPadula rules can be applied to ensure that a workﬂow
meets the security requirements of its constituent services
and data. The method is then extended to cloud com-
puting by assigning security levels to clouds, and building
on Bell-LaPadula to deﬁne a method for determining if
security requirements are met in a particular deployment
of the constituent parts of a workﬂow onto a set of clouds.
The Calculating valid deployment options section then
deﬁnes a method for enumerating all valid options for
deploying a workﬂow over a set of clouds so as to meet
security requirements. It highlights the issues raised when
data must ﬂow between clouds, and shows the work-
ﬂow transformations and security checks that must be
included in the method if security is to be guaranteed. The
result is a set of valid options; the Selecting a deploy-
ment option with a cost model section then introduces
a model that can be used to select the best option. The
method is then applied to a second, more complex exam-
ple (in the A more complex example section). A tool
has been designed and built to implement the method.
As described in the Tooling Section, it is structured as a
set of rules, transforms and a cost model, allowing it to
be enhanced to meet other non-functional requirements,
including dependability. Following a review of related
work, the paper draws conclusions and outlines further
work.
Method
This section describes how the Bell-LaPadula security
model can be applied to workﬂows, and can then be
extended to the deployment of workﬂows on clouds.
Through this section, a workﬂow is modeled as a directed
graph in which services and data are represented as nodes.
Services consume zero or more data items and generate
one or more data items; the edges in the graph represent
the data dependencies.
Representing security requirements
The Bell-LaPadula multi-level access control model [3] is
adopted, with services modeled as the subjects (S), and
data as the objects (O) [4]. The security model therefore
consists of the following:
• a set of actions (A) that subjects (S ) can carry out on
objects (O). In the case of services operating on data
in a workﬂow, the actions are limited to read and
write. Therefore, the set of actions (A) is: A = {r,w}
• a poset of security levels: L
• a permissions matrix:M : S × O → A (the contents
of the matrix are determined by the workﬂow design;
i.e. if service s1 reads datum d0 then there will be an
entry in the matrix: s1 × d0 → r ; similarly, if service
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s1 writes datum d2 then there will be an entry in the
matrix: s1 × d2 → w)
• an access matrix: B : S×O → A (this is determined by
the execution of the workﬂow: if there are no choice
points then it will equal the permissions matrix,
however, if there are choice points then it will equal a
subset of the permissions matrix corresponding to the
path taken through the workﬂow when it is executed.
• a clearance map: C : S → L (this represents the
maximum security level at which each service can
operate)
• a location map: l : S + O → L (this represents the
security level of each service and datum in the
workﬂow)
In a typical Multi-Level Security scenario, the system
moves through a set of states, and the model can have
diﬀerent values for permissions, access, clearance and
location in each state. However, here the execution of a
workﬂow is modeled as taking place within a single state.
Normally a service would be expected to have a clearance
that is constant across all uses of that service in workﬂows,
however the location can be chosen speciﬁcally for each
workﬂow, or even (though less likely) for each invocation
of a workﬂow. However, the model itself is general, and
makes no assumptions on this.
The Bell-LaPadula model states that a system is secure
with respect to the abovemodel if the following conditions
are satisﬁed ∀subjectsu ∈ S and ∀objectsi ∈ O
authorization:Bui ⊆ Mui (1)
clearance:l(u) ≤ c(u) (2)
no-read-up:r ∈ Bui ⇒ c(u) ≥ l(i) (3)
no-write-down:w ∈ Bui ⇒ l(u) ≤ l(i) (4)
For workﬂows, the implications of these conditions are:
(1) all actions carried out by services must conform to
the permissions granted to those services
(2) a service can only operate at a security level
(location) that is less than or equal to its clearance
(3) a service cannot read data that is at a higher security
level than its own clearance
(4) a service cannot write data to a lower security level
than its own location.
For example, consider a service s1 which consumes
datum d0 and produces datum d2:
d0 → s1 → d2
(in these diagrams, the → is used to show data depen-
dency, and each block – service or datum – is uniquely
identiﬁed by the subscript). The following rules must be
met:
by (3)
c(s1) ≥ l(d0) (5)
and by (4)
l(d2) ≥ l(s1) (6)
The relationship between security levels is captured in
Figure 2. Arrows represent ≥ relationships.
Whilst assigning a security level to a datum in a work-
ﬂow is directly analogous to assigning a level to an object
(e.g. a document) in the standard Bell-LaPadula model,
assigning a security level to a service may be less intuitive.
The justiﬁcation is that an organization may have diﬀer-
ing levels of conﬁdence in the set of services they wish to
use. For example, they may be very conﬁdent that a ser-
vice written in-house, or provided by a trusted supplier,
will not reveal the data it consumes and produces to a
third party either deliberately or through poor design; in
contrast, there is a risk that a service downloaded from
the Internet, of unknown provenance, may do just that.
Therefore, the organization can assign a high security
level to the former service, and a low level to the latter.
For a speciﬁc workﬂow, when an organization’s secu-
rity experts are assigning locations to services, they may
in some cases chose to set the location below that of the
clearance level in order to allow a service to create data
that is at a lower level than its clearance level; i.e. so that
the no write down rule (4) is not violated. This may, for
example, take place when the expert knows that the out-
put data will not be sensitive, given the speciﬁc data that
the service will consume as input in this speciﬁc workﬂow.
A concrete example would be a service that summarizes
textual data. This has been written to a high standard, and
the security expert is conﬁdent that it will not leak data to
a third party. Therefore, its clearance is high. However, in
one particular workﬂow it is known that this service will
only be used to summarise public data downloaded from
the World Wide Web, which is also where its output will
be published. Therefore, the security expert would set the
Figure 2 The relationship between security levels for a service
that consumes and produces data.
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service’s location to an appropriately low level so that the
write down rule was not violated.
Cloud security
This section describes how the Bell-LaPadula model, as
applied to workﬂows, can be extended to encompass cloud
computing.
Let us say that an organization wishes to run a par-
ticular workﬂow. As more than one cloud is available, a
decision must be made as to where the data and services
should be placed. In current practice, it is typical that a
security expert or system administrator would just take a
considered view on the overall security level of the work-
ﬂow, and that of the clouds on which it could be deployed.
For example, let us say that there are two clouds, one a
highly trusted private cloud contained within the intranet
of the organization, and the other a less trusted public
cloud. It may seem obvious in this case that a workﬂow
that operates on sensitive medical data should run only on
the internal cloud. Similarly, a workﬂow that summarises
public data could be deployed on the public cloud. How-
ever, there are two problems with this approach. Firstly,
it is informal, being based on an expert’s judgment; a
systematic approach is preferable as it will give more con-
sistent, defendable results. Secondly, the approach deploys
the whole of a workﬂow on a single cloud. This rules out
other options that may:
• reduce cost: for example by running less sensitive, but
computationally intensive, sub-parts of the workﬂow
on a public cloud if that avoids the need to purchase
expensive new servers so that the internal cloud can
handle the extra load
• increase reliability: for example by having the option
to run on a public cloud if the private cloud has an
outage
• increase performance: for example by taking
advantage of the greater processing capacity of the
public cloud for the computationally intensive
services in a workﬂow
Therefore, the rest of this section extends the secu-
rity model introduced earlier in order to allow systematic
decisions to be taken on where the services and data
within a workﬂow may be deployed to ensure security
requirements are met.
To do this, the location map is extended to include
clouds which we denote by P (to avoid confusion with the
C conventionally used to denote the clearance map):
• location map: l : S + O + P → L
Also, H is added to represent the mapping from each
service and datum to a cloud:
H : S + O → P]
We then add a rule that any block (service or datum)
must be deployed on a cloud that is at a location that is
greater than or equal to that of the block, e.g. for a block x
on cloud y:
l(py) ≥ l(bx) (7)
Returning to the example service introduced in the
previous section:
d0 → s1 → d2
if, inH, d0 is on cloud pa, s1 on pb and d2 on cloud pc then
the following must be true:
l(pa) ≥ l(d0) (8)
l(pb) ≥ l(s1) (9)
l(pc) ≥ l(d2) (10)
This allows us to extend (6) to:
l(pc) ≥ l(d2) ≥ l(s1) (11)
The complete relationship between security levels for
blocks and clouds is captured in Figure 3.
Calculating valid deployment options
Using the above model and rules, it is now possible to
automatically enumerate all the valid deployment options
for a workﬂow. These are generated in two stages. Firstly,
given the following:
• the set of clouds P
• the set of services S
• the set of data O
• the map of security locations l
we can deﬁne the valid mappings of services and data onto
clouds, using rule (7):
V : S + O → P
V = {b → p|b ∈ S + O, p ∈ P, l(b) ≤ l(p)}
Figure 3 The relationship between cloud and workﬂow block
security levels.
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To illustrate this, we use the medical workﬂow of
Figure 1, with two clouds. This has two services connected
in a pipeline, each with one datum as input and one as
output:
d0 → s1 → d2 → s3 → d4
Table 1 shows an example location and clearance table
(while the scheme is general, this example uses only two
security levels: 0 and 1). Here, c1 is a private cloud, which
is at a higher security level than the public cloud c0. The
patient data (d0) is at the highest security level, while the
other data is at the lower level as it is not conﬁdential.
Service s1 is cleared to access conﬁdential data at level 1,
but its location has been set to 0 in this workﬂow so that
it can produce non-conﬁdential output at level 0 without
violating the Bell-LaPadula “no-write-down” rule (4).
Based on this mapping of blocks and clouds to locations,
Table 2 then shows the possible valid placement of each
block onto the two clouds.
Having determined all valid mappings of services and
data to clouds, the set of all valid workﬂow deployments is
given by:
W : (S + O → P) → {(S + O → P)} =
{w ∈ ||V ||,∀b ∈ S+O.∃p ∈ P.b → p ∈ w, |w| = |S+O|}
Where ||V || is the power set of V and |w| is the cardi-
nality of w. Algorithmically, in the implementation of the
method, W is computed by forming the cross-product of
the block-to-cloud mappings contained in V.
All possible valid workﬂow deployments – as deﬁned
by W – for the running medical workﬂow example are
shown in Figure 4. The cloud on which a datum or service
is deployed is indicated as a superscript; e.g. daj is datum j
deployed on cloud a.
Transferring data between clouds
There is still an important issue to be addressed: the
approach makes assumptions that are unrealistic for a
practical distributed workﬂow system. It assumes that:
Table 1 Locations and clearances for themedical analysis
example
Location (l) Clearance (c)
d0 1
s1 0 1
d2 0
s3 0 0
d4 0
c0 0
c1 1
Table 2 Valid mappings of blocks to clouds
Block Cloud c0 Cloud c1
d0 •
s1 • •
d2 • •
s3 • •
d4 • •
1. a service can generate as its output a datum directly
on another cloud, without that item being ﬁrst stored
on the same cloud as the service
2. a service can consume as its input a datum directly
from another cloud, without that item ever being
stored on the same cloud as the service
This problem is solved in two stages. Firstly, a new
type of service is introduced – sxfer – which will trans-
fer data from one cloud to another (this is analogous to
the exchange operator used in distributed query process-
ing [5]). It would be implemented with sub-components
running on the source and destination clouds. The sxfer
service takes a datum on one cloud and creates a copy on
another. All the workﬂows generated byW are then trans-
formed to insert the transfer nodes whenever there is a
inter-cloud edge in the workﬂow graph. There are four
graph transformations:
daj → sai ⇒ daj → sai (12)
daj → sbi ⇒ daj → sxfer → dbj → sbi (13)
sai → daj ⇒ sai → daj (14)
sai → dbj ⇒ sai → daj → sxfer → dbj (15)
Transforms (12) and (14) reﬂect the fact that if both
nodes are deployed on the same cloud then no change is
needed. In contrast, (13) and (15) introduce new sxfer
nodes to transfer data between clouds.
Unfortunately, the creation of new copies of data
through transforms (13) and (15) introduces potential
security problems. When transform (13) is applied, there
is the need to check that cloud b has a suﬃciently high
security level to store the copy of dj that would be created
on it (the copy inherits the security level of the original).
The following rule must therefore be checked to ensure
this is true:
l(pb) ≥ l(dj) (16)
Similarly, for transform 15:
l(pa) ≥ l(dj) (17)
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Figure 4 All valid workﬂows produced bymapping blocks to
clouds.
If either is violated then the workﬂow does not meet the
security requirements, and so should be removed from the
set W of valid mappings of services and data to clouds.
Proof that this violation can only occur in two speciﬁc
cases now follows.
Firstly, consider (16). By rule (2) we have:
c(sbi ) ≥ l(sbi ) (18)
First consider the case where:
c(sbi ) = l(sbi ) (19)
i.e. the clearance of the object is equal to its location.
Rules (3) and (4) give
c(sbi ) ≥ l(dj) (20)
and
l(pb) ≥ l(sbi ) (21)
then, by (19)
l(pb) ≥ l(sbi ) ≥ l(dj) ⇒ l(pb) ≥ l(dj) (22)
and rule (16) is satisﬁed. Therefore, in this case there are
no violations.
However, if:
c(sbi ) > l(sbi ) (23)
i.e. the clearance of the service is strictly greater than its
location then combining (23) with (3) and (4) in a similar
way to the above, we get:
l(sbi ) < c(sbi ) ≥ l(dj) (24)
and
l(pb) ≤ l(sbi ) < c(sbi ) (25)
so it is possible that
l(pb) < l(dj) (26)
in which case rule (16) is violated and so that partic-
ular workﬂow deployment does not meet the security
requirements.
Turning now to the data produced by services, rule (17)
can be violated by transform (15) in the case where the
service s0 writes up data (4) to a level such that:
l(pa) < l(dj)
The eﬀect of the transformations is to modify the
security lattice of Figure 2 to that of Figure 5. The arc from
l(pb) to l(d0) is introduced by transform (13) which adds
a copy of d0 into the workﬂow, while the arc from l(pb) to
l(d2) is introduced by transform (15) which adds a copy of
d2.
Applying the transformations to each workﬂow in
Figure 4, followed by rules (16) and (17) removes half of
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Figure 5 The relationship between security levels after transformation for inter-cloud data transfer.
the possible deployment options. Removing two dupli-
cates created by the transformations leaves the six valid
options shown in Figure 6. Another view of the remain-
ing options is shown in Figure 7. As services can have
multiple inputs and outputs, the arcs in the diagrams are
labelled with the input / output number. These diagrams
were generated automatically by the tool we have built to
implement the methods described in this paper. The aim
is to provide a security expert with an easy to understand
view of the possible options.
Whilst a simple, linear workﬂow has been used here
to illustrate the method, it is applicable to all workﬂows
that can be represented by a directed graph, whatever
their structure. The discussion so far does however still
leave open the issue of how to choose between these
valid options? The next section therefore describes how a
cost model (also implemented in the tool) can be used to
select the best option based on the charges made by the
cloud providers.
Selecting a deployment option with a cost model
Once all valid options for allocating services and
data to clouds have been determined, one must be
selected, and used to enact the workﬂow. This deci-
sion could be made by a deployment expert, but
this section describes how it can be achieved auto-
matically through the use of a cost model. Diﬀer-
ent criteria may be important for diﬀerent applications
(e.g. dependability, performance), but this section illus-
trates the approach by describing a model that minimizes
price.
Cloud pricing is measured using the metrics by which
cloud providers allocate charges. For a cloud (p) this is
represented as:
• volume of data transferred into a cloud: epdxi• volume of data transferred out of a cloud: epdxo• volume of data stored, per unit of time for which it is
stored: epds
Figure 6 TheWorkﬂows that remain valid after Transfer Blocks are Added.
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Figure 7 The six valid cloudmappings.
• time units of cpu consumed in the execution of a
service: epcpu
Cost metrics are characterised for a datum (d) as:
• data size: size(d)
• data longevity – the length of time the datum is
stored: longevity(d)
Finally, the cost metric for a service (s) is characterised
as:
• time units of cpu consumed in the execution of a
service: cpu(s)
The cost model for a workﬂow execution can then be
deﬁned as:
cost =
d=k−1∑
d=0
epds.size(d).longevity(d)+
s=m−1∑
s=0
epcpu.cpu(s)+
x=q−1∑
x=0
(epsdxo + epddxi).size(d)
where k is the number of data items in the workﬂow, and
m is the number of services, while q is the number of
inter-cloud data transfers. In the third term that calculates
data transfer costs, ps represents the source cloud and pd
the destination cloud for the transfer.
Using the cost model requires estimates of data sizes
and cpu costs. This is realistic for many workﬂows, and
producing these estimates is made easier if performance
and capacity are logged for each run, so allowing statisti-
cal analysis to generate predictions. This is, for example,
done by the e-Science Central cloud platform [6] which
logs data on all data sizes, and service execution times.
Two examples now highlight the use of the model. Con-
sider the valid mapping options shown in Figure 7 for the
running medical workﬂow example. In the simplest case,
if the performance and cost of both clouds are equal (as
in Table 3), then the cost diﬀerence between options is
dependent only on the number of inter-cloud communi-
cations. Table 4 gives example values for the blocks in
the workﬂow. The size of d0 will be known as it is the
input to the workﬂow, while that for d2 and d4 are esti-
mates, perhaps based on the results of previous runs. To
set the longevity values, it is assumed that the input (d0)
Table 3 Cloud costs: Example 1
Cloud Storage Transfer in Transfer out CPU
(GB / Month) (/GB) (/GB) (/s)
c0 10 10 10 10
c1 10 10 10 10
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Table 4 Block info
Block Size Longevity CPU
(GB) (months) (s)
d0 10 12
s1 100
d2 5 0
s3 50
d4 1 12
and output data (d4) is stored for a year, while intermedi-
ate data (d2) (along with any intermediate copies of data
created by transforms) is immediately discarded once it
has been consumed by a service: in this case s2.
Table 5 shows the results when the cost model is applied.
Each row represents the cost of an option in Figure 6. The
ﬁnal column of the table gives the order of the options
(from lowest to highest cost). This conﬁrms that the
cheapest is option 6, in which all the blocks are deployed
on the same cloud, and so there are no inter-cloud transfer
costs.
While it may seem that an option in which all ser-
vices and data are deployed on a single cloud will
always be the cheapest, if CPU costs vary between
clouds, then inter-cloud transfers may be worthwhile.
Table 6 shows clouds with a diﬀerent set of cost param-
eters. Here, a private cloud (c1) has higher security,
but higher CPU and data costs, compared to a public
cloud (c0). The eﬀect of plugging these values into the
cost model is shown in Table 7. The result is that the
best option is now the one that allocates as much work
as possible to the public cloud, which has lower CPU
costs.
Amore complex example
The medical example used to date consists to a purely
linear workﬂow: each service reads and writes only one
data item. However, the method supports arbitrary work-
ﬂows, and this is now demonstrated through the example
of a more complex workﬂow,which is based on that intro-
duced in [4]. It is shown in Figure 8.
Table 5 Workﬂow deployment options costs: Example 1
Option Storage Transfer CPU Total Order
1 1320 100 1500 2920 3
2 1320 120 1500 2940 4
3 1320 220 1500 3040 6
4 1320 200 1500 3020 5
5 1320 20 1500 2840 2
6 1320 0 1500 2820 1
Table 6 Cloud costs: Example 2
Cloud Storage Transfer in Transfer out CPU
(GB / Month) (/GB) (/GB) (/s)
c0 5 5 5 5
c1 10 5 5 10
With security settings shown in Table 8, the workﬂow
meets the Bell-LaPadula criteria, and produces the three
workﬂow partitionings shown in Figure 9.
With block costs from Table 9 and cloud costs from
Table 6 (as in the previous example), the costs of the three
partitioning options are shown in Table 10. This example
illustrates the importance of the use of the cost model in
allowing an expert or automatic deployment system to ﬁl-
ter out valid but ineﬃcient workﬂow partitionings such as
option 2.
Tooling
The method described in this paper has been imple-
mented in a tool which takes the workﬂow and security
requirements as input, and generates as output the set
of valid partitions with costs. The tool is implemented in
the functional language Haskell [7], with workﬂows repre-
sented as directed graphs. This section explains how the
tool implements the multi-level security method that is
the focus of this paper, and then goes on to explain how
it can be used to process other classes of non-functional
requirements.
The tool is structured so that three types of functions
are used to process the initial workﬂow:
1. Transformation functions take a workﬂow as input
and generate a set of workﬂows derived from it. In
the multi-level security method they are used for two
purposes: to generate the candidate workﬂow
partitionings from the initial workﬂow (Figure 4);
and to insert the inter-cloud transfers according to
(13) and (15).
2. Rules are implemented as ﬁlter functions that take a
workﬂow as input and return a boolean indicating
whether the workﬂow meets the rule. Workﬂows
that do not meet a rule are removed from the set of
Table 7 Workﬂow deployment options costs: Example 2
Option Storage Transfer CPU Total Order
1 1260 75 1250 2585 1
2 1320 90 1250 2660 2
3 1260 165 1500 2925 5
4 1320 150 1500 2970 6
5 1260 15 1500 2775 3
6 1320 0 1500 2820 4
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Figure 8 Amore complex workﬂow.
Table 8 Block locations and clearances
Location (l) Clearance (c)
s10 0 1
s26 0 0
s32 1 1
s44 0 1
s58 1 1
d11 1
d27 0
d33 1
d45 1
d59 1
valid workﬂows. In the methods described in this
paper, they are used to check that the initial
workﬂow conforms to Bell-LaPadula (Figure 2), and
that the candidate workﬂow partitionings conform to
Figure 3.
3. Cost Model functions take in a candidate workﬂow
and assign a cost. They are used to implement the
model described in Section “Selecting a deployment
option with a cost model”.
Overall, the tool takes the initial workﬂow (e.g. that of
Figure 1) and security requirements, applies the set of
transformations and rules, and then uses the cost model
function to rank the valid workﬂows.
The tool also automatically generates the diagrams that
are shown in Figure 7 using the GraphViz software library
[8]; these visualisations have proved to be a useful way
to review the available options. It can also generate an
html report for a security review, containing all the infor-
mation generated by the method, including the diagrams,
security tables and ranked cost tables. Finally, it can auto-
matically generate LATEXtables. Therefore all the tables and
diagrams used in this paper have been automatically gen-
erated by the tool. Automatically generating diagrams and
tables eliminates the risk of transcription errors [9] when
conveying results through reports and papers. These
reports can be used by system administrators to conﬁg-
ure the partitions manually onto the clouds, but we are
also currently developing a tool to do this automatically,
as described in the next section.
Generalising the approach
While this paper focuses on meeting security require-
ments, the structure of the tool,with its three types of
functions described above, allows it to be utilised as a gen-
eral system for generating partitions of workﬂows over
clouds that meet non-functional requirements. As well
as security, those requirements can include dependability
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Figure 9 Valid workﬂow partitionings for the second example.
and performance. For example, the tool is currently being
extended to encompass dependability requirements. One
example requirement came out of discussions with the
designer of an application in which the key workﬂow was
very similar to that of Figure 1, but with the additional
constraint that the input and output data for the workﬂow
as a whole (e.g. d0 and d4 in Figure 1) must not be stored
on the same cloud.We were able to meet this requirement
simply by adding one extra rule into the tool. This is a
function apart that takes three arguments:
• the set of blocks that need to be kept apart on
diﬀerent clouds
• the mapping of blocks onto clouds
• the workﬂow to be checked against the rule
The result of the function is true if every block con-
tained in the ﬁrst argument is deployed on a diﬀerent
cloud. One subtlety is that the function must take into
account the fact that transformations may create one or
more copies of the blocks that have been speciﬁed by the
user as needing to be kept apart. For example, transforms
(13) and (15) can create such copies. It is important that
those copies are also included in the set of blocks that
need to be kept apart. This is is achieved by exploiting
the fact that the tool assigns blocks a name and identi-
ﬁer pair, e.g. ‘(xfer,14)’. While the identiﬁer of each block
is unique, the name can be shared by multiple blocks.
When a block is copied by a transformation, it is given the
same name but a new, unique identiﬁer (similarly, separate
deployments of the same service share the same name,
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Table 9 Block Costs
Size Longevity CPU
d1 10 12
d2 5 12
d3 1 0
d4 20 0
d5 20 12
s1 100
s2 50
s3 10
s4 40
s5 60
but have a diﬀerent unique identiﬁer), e.g. a transform
copying data item (d,14) could generate (d,27) where 27
is a unique identiﬁer, not shared with another block. The
apart function therefore works by comparing whether
two blocks with the same name are stored on the same
cloud, irrespective of their identiﬁers. For the running
medical workﬂow example, adding the rule that d0 and d4
in Figure 1 must be deployed on diﬀerent clouds results
in only allowing the single partitioning option shown in
Figure 10.
Figure 11 shows the architecture of the generalised tool.
The Deployment Manager takes in the workﬂow and the
user’s non-functional requirements. It uses the rules and
transformations to generate a set of valid partitionings
over the available clouds, and then applies a cost model to
rank them. The ‘best’ workﬂow is then executed across the
set of clouds.
To achieve this, each cloud must run software that
can store data and execute workﬂows. In this work the
e-Science Central cloud platform [6] is used. This has the
advantage of providing a portable platform that can be
deployed on a range of clouds including public clouds
(Amazon and Windows Azure) but also private clouds.
Figure 12 shows the e-Science Central Architecture.
This is a cloud Platform-as-a-Service that provides users
with the ability to store, share and analyse data in the
cloud. Data can be uploaded and tagged with structured
or unstructured metadata. Tools are provided to allow
services, written in a variety of languages, to be pack-
aged and loaded into the platform. Users can then create
workﬂows from those services and execute them in the
Table 10 Workﬂow partitioning option costs
Option Storage Transfer CPU Total Rank
1 4500 50 2350 6900 2
2 5100 100 2600 7800 3
3 4200 0 2600 6800 1
Figure 10 The only valid workﬂow partitioning if d0 and d4 must
not be deployed on the same cloud.
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Figure 11 The Architecture of the General CloudWorkﬂow
Partitioning Tool.
cloud; a graphical, in-browser editor is provided to allow
users to create new workﬂows. e-Science Central provides
scalable cloud computing as it can distribute the execu-
tion of a set of workﬂows across a set of nodes. This is
mainly used to scale throughput (to increase the num-
ber of workﬂow executions per second), but it can also be
used to reduce response time where there are opportuni-
ties to execute sub-workﬂows in parallel. The system has
achieved scalability at over 90% eﬃciency, when running
on up to 190 cloud nodes, each with two cores.
All accesses to e-Science Central system are policed by
a Security service. This ensures that access to all data, ser-
vices and workﬂows can be controlled by users. The basis
for this is a social networking system that allows users to
connect to each other, as well as to create and join groups.
Users can chose to keep data, services and workﬂows pri-
vate, or can share them with other users, or with groups
to which they are connected.
All actions carried out in e-Science Central are recorded
in an audit/provenance log. Users can view and query the
subset of this log that the security system permits them
to see. This allows users to determine exactly how each
data item was created (e.g. the graph of service/workﬂow
executions) and how it has been used.
e-Science Central has a Software-as-a-Service interface
that allows users to perform all actions through a web
browser. In addition, there is an API so that programs
can drive the system. This includes all the actions needed
to deploy and execute partitioned workﬂows over feder-
ated clouds: storing data, creating and executing work-
ﬂows. The portability of e-Science Central means that the
‘Deployment Manager’ in Figure 11 can create and trig-
ger the execution of the workﬂow partitions in exactly the
same way, irrespective of the underlying cloud on which
the partition is deployed and executed.
Figure 11 shows two way communication between the
‘Deployment Manager’ and ‘e-Science Central’. The above
description of the tool describes the ﬂow of information
Figure 12 The Architecture of the portable e-Science Central Cloud Platform.
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from the ‘Deployment Manager’ to the ‘e-Science Central’
instances in the form of workﬂow partitions to be exe-
cuted. Information ﬂowing in the reverse direction can
include cost updates. If cloud providers start to vary
their pricing models frequently, and provide APIs to
access it, this information could also be fed back into
the Deployment Manager so that the cost models can
be kept up-to-date. e-Science Central also has a sophis-
ticated provenance capture and analysis system [10]; this
includes collecting information on data sizes and service
execution times that can be used to improve the accu-
racy of the estimated block costs that feed into the cost
models.
The Deployment Manager could also monitor the avail-
ability of the clouds, for example by sending regular “ping”
requests to the e-Science Central deployments, or by
including time-outs in the calls to execute a workﬂow par-
tition on a cloud. This would then allow it to select dynam-
ically between possible workﬂow partitionings based on
which clouds are currently available. Of course, there is
a danger that all valid options depend on the availability
of one particular cloud (as in the running medical work-
ﬂow example). Rather than discover this at run-time, it is
possible to determine this statically using the tool. This
can be done by running the tool multiple times, each time
omitting one cloud. This will determine whether the exe-
cution of a workﬂow is critically dependent on a single
cloud (in this case the tool will generate no valid options).
Having done this, an organization for whom the workﬂow
is business-critical could ensure that the cloud in ques-
tion has suﬃciently high levels of availability, or identify
(or create) a second cloud with a suﬃciently high security
clearance that could also be used by the workﬂow if the
other failed.
Related work
The motivation for this paper came from the author’s
experience of cloud applications with security constraints
(e.g. healthcare applications in the ‘Social Inclusion
through the Digital Economy’ (SiDE) project [11]). How-
ever, the general concern that security was a barrier to use
of the cloud for many organizations and applications has
been widely discussed [1]. The general issues associated
with security and clouds are discussed in [12]. A high-
level approach to deciding where an application could be
deployed is discussed in [13]. Another approach to elicit-
ing and exploiting information on the security and other
properties of clouds is described in [14]. These method-
ologies could be valuable in assigning security levels to
clouds, services and data: something which is orthogonal
to the scheme described in this paper.
In [4], Bell-LaPadula is also applied to workﬂow secu-
rity. Petri Nets are used to model the workﬂow, rather
than the approach taken in this paper. However, the key
diﬀerence is that its scope does not extend to considering
the deployment of blocks within a workﬂow across a set of
computational resources, as this paper does. It also diﬀers
in including clearance but not location in its embodiment
of Bell-LaPadula.
There has been a large body of work on using cost mod-
els to predict execution times in order to select between
options for deploying workﬂows over grids and clouds
[15,16]. However, perhaps due to the relatively recent
introduction of pay-as-you-go cloud computing, there is
much less work on using price-based cost models. In
[17], both execution time and price-based models are
used to compare a set of options for allocating a work-
ﬂow over local resources and a public cloud. The work
in [18] uses non-linear programming to generate options
for using clouds to execute a workﬂow. Security is not a
consideration in any of these papers.
Once the partitioning of a workﬂow over a set of
clouds has been decided, a distributed workﬂow enact-
ment engine is needed to actually run the workﬂow. The
issues around this are discussed in [19] and a solution is
proposed.
Conclusions
This paper has described a new method for automatically
determining valid options for partitioning a workﬂow of
services and data across a set of clouds based on secu-
rity requirements. A cost model is then used to choose
between the available options. Themain contribution is to
show how multi-level security, which has previously been
applied to workﬂows, can be extended to encompass the
allocation of workﬂow services and data to clouds. This
has demonstrated that the need for inter-cloud data trans-
fers raises interesting potential security violations that
need to be addressed; in the running medical workﬂow
example, this ruled out over half of the possible partition-
ing options. Although the paper focuses on workﬂows, the
method can be applied to other distributed systems whose
components are to be partitioned over a set of clouds.
The tool developed to implement the method has
proved invaluable in two ways. Firstly, it removes the
chance of human error in applying the various stages
of the method to the input workﬂow. To reinforce this
advantage, it can automatically generate both html and
LATEXtables, diagrams and reports (the LATEXtables were
used in this paper). Secondly, developing the tool forced us
to think about how best to structure the implementation
of the method, which resulted in a very general system
that operates on rules, transforms and cost models.Whilst
the focus of this paper is on the multi-level security rules
and transforms, as described in sub-section “Generalis-
ing the approach”, we have been exploring the extension of
the approach to other non-functional requirements such
as dependability. Whilst this work is ongoing, even in
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its current form the method can illuminate dependabil-
ity issues; for example, analysing the set of valid options
can highlight the dependency of the workﬂow on a spe-
ciﬁc cloud (as in the running medical workﬂow example).
This will allow an organization which is dependent on the
workﬂow to ensure that this cloud has suﬃciently high
levels of availability, or encourage it to identify a second
cloud with a suﬃciently high security clearance that could
also be used by the workﬂow.
Overall, the hope is that the approach described in this
paper can move the process of partitioning workﬂows
over federated clouds from one in which a human admin-
istrator makes an informed but ad-hoc choice, to one in
which a tool, such as the one built to implement this
method, can determine the valid options based on a rigor-
ous underlying set of rules, and then suggest which is the
best, based on a cost model. The approach therefore has
the advantage that it can reduce both security violations
and execution costs.
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